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Abstract  
Kosovo’s first Pride parade on October 10, 2017 was an important landmark for Kosovo’s 
LGBT community. The event was remarkable both as the first event of its kind and in that 
it occurred without violence. While the Western Balkans have seen significant progress on 
LGBT rights, differences in degree of homophobia are clear across the former Yugoslav 
states. Slovenia and Croatia have become the least homophobic in the region while Serbia 
and Kosovo are the most. Where other arguments fail to adequately justify this disparity, 
EU accession explains the emergent differences in LGBT human rights since the breakup 
of Yugoslavia. 
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Section 1: Introduction 
 To most countries, the installation of the state’s first openly gay Prime Minister 
would be a moment of great celebration for local LGBT NGOs and activists. When 
Serbia’s President Vucić appointed Ana Brnabić to the office, local LGBT NGOs didn’t 
so much sing her praises as they rolled their eyes. Despite the fact that Brnabić made 
Serbia just the fifth state with an openly LGBT1 head of state, LGBT NGOs responded 
with skepticism that Brnabić’s appointment indicated a shift in the perception of the 
LGBT community in Serbia. Rather, they viewed the symbolism of her appointment as a 
gesture to the international community, most notably the European Union (EU). This 
came after a couple years of consistent annual Pride events following several years of 
consistently cancelled Pride events by the state under the guise of security concerns. So-
called security concerns are frequently a pretext to bar Pride events in many conservative 
Central and Eastern European states. The violence at Serbia’s 2010 Pride served as such 
an excuse until the next Pride in 2014. (Fecanji 2017; McLaughlin 2017).  
The situation for LGBT persons in Serbia or their southern neighbor Kosovo is 
pairs interestingly with that of the other former Yugoslav states of Slovenia and Croatia. 
Where LGBT rights have been slow to improve with only a handful of recent changes 
                                               
1 Here I use LGBT to refer to the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender community. LGBTI meaning 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex is more common both in the Western Balkans and in the 
literature on the region. I have deliberately chosen not to use LGBTI because discussing the human rights 
of intersex individuals is outside the scope of this project due to both a lack of existing literature and lack 
of protections for LGBT individuals both at the state level and at the EU level in these cases. LGBTQ 
meaning Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer is more commonly used in the United States as 
the inclusion of Queer makes the term more inclusive, however, LGBTQ is not commonly used in the 
Western Balkans and there is contestation around the English language-centric nature of the term Queer. 
For these reasons I have elected not to use LGBTQ in this project.  
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over the last few years in Serbia and Kosovo, Slovenia and Croatia have seen huge 
developments in LGBT human rights in the last decade. These states, united in 
Yugoslavia for nearly seventy-five years, have moved apart dramatically in their 
treatment of LGBT rights since the 1990s. Why have LGBT rights emerged in some 
former Yugoslav states where they are slow to develop in others? 
 Another key area of variation in the former Yugoslav states is Europeanization, 
the process of becoming integrated into the European Union and centralizing a 
“European” identity. Where some former Yugoslav states have been included in the 
Eastern Expansion of the EU into Eastern Europe others remain slow to move towards 
EU membership at varying stages of the accession process. Slovenia and Croatia are 
currently the only two former Yugoslav states to have completed the accession process 
and become EU members, in 2004 and 2013 respectively. Serbia and Kosovo remain 
outside the EU but not outside the sphere of its influence. The economic and political 
benefits of EU membership are highly desirable and influence the actions of the 
governments of these states to do things they otherwise might not to receive these 
benefits. At present Serbia is a candidate for EU membership while Kosovo is a potential 
membership candidate and has had extensive, if not unique, ties to the EU since the 
beginning of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) in 2008.  
In these cases, there is a correlation between progress towards EU membership 
and making improvements on LGBT human rights. Since the early 2000s, LGBT human 
rights, falling under the category of fundamental rights, have become increasingly 
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important to the accession process. The ideas of being European and LGBT friendly are 
tied for the Eastern Enlargement states in ways they were not in previous enlargements 
because of this recent increase. In this paper I argue a causal relationship between EU 
accession processes and LGBT human rights. Potential EU membership provides states 
with incentives to change their approach to fundamental rights, including LGBT human 
rights, in ways they otherwise might not. This relationship tracks when examining the 
timelines of EU accession and LGBT rights in each of these cases.  
There are other arguments as to the causes of these variations in LGBT rights 
across the former Yugoslav states. While the purpose of this paper is specifically to make 
the argument of the direct influence of the EU in LGBT rights as the cause of these 
variations, I do not believe that I can effectively make this case without addressing some 
of these alternative explanations. The literature on homophobia offers multiple causes of 
homophobia, including state-level homophobia, which could be applicable in these cases. 
In outlining the context for the four cases in this paper in Section 2 I also address some of 
these alternative explanations and why I believe, in the context of the former Yugoslav 
states, these explanations are not useful.  
1.2 Argument 
 Based on the structure of the EU accession process, Eastern Europe’s lagging 
record on LGBT rights, and the incentives for Eastern European states to join the EU, I 
argue that in the case of the former Yugoslav states EU accession plays a significant role 
in the shifting status of LGBT rights. States which have progressed through EU accession 
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in the 21st century have had the external motivation in the benefits of EU membership 
and exposure to norm diffusion processes to change significantly with regard to LGBT 
human rights. Whereas, in states who are not EU member candidates or only part way 
through the accession process that incentive to counter public and institutional resistance 
to LGBT human rights is not as present. In the 1990s and 2000s the EU has instituted 
expectations of new member states of the fifth and sixth enlargements, in 2004 and 2013 
respectively around LGBT rights that were not in force for states which joined the EU in 
the Twentieth century. Slootmaeckers and Touquet (2016) describe this as the co-
evolution of EU enlargement and fundamental human rights policies on LGBT rights (19-
21). The influence of both official standards around LGBT rights in the EU and ideals of 
Europe as uniquely LGBT-friendly continent is a new phenomenon (2016).   
 Theories of norm diffusion2 show that a connection between states (or between a 
collection of states and an individual state) can facilitate the diffusion of ideas, values, 
and norms from the group to the individual state. While an institution, like the EU, can 
have very direct, intentional impact on the actions and official opinion of the state and 
political actors it cannot, by its nature, have such a direct impact on public opinion. 
However, norm diffusion is much more subtle and shaped more by the connection 
between the institution and the state than the power of the institution. Because norm 
diffusion, in addition to official policy changes, is involved in Europeanization, we 
should see Europeanization exhibit changes in the broader society outside the 
                                               
2 For more on norm diffusion see section 3.2 
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government. While norm diffusion, for example, may not change the positions of 
organized nationalist groups on LGBT rights, it can normalize the LGBT community and 
LGBT rights in the public. It can also connect local LGBT organizations to LGBT 
organization in the EU allowing for broader organization and the influence of non-local 
LGBT organization in respective new member or candidate states. Due to norm diffusion, 
in the EU accession process we can also expect to see local NGOs emboldened and 
empowered to pursue change within their state. EU accession can create opportunity and 
support, through the incentives for the state and norm diffusion respectively, for NGOs to 
push for further legislative progress in LGBT rights.  
1.3 Methods 
To examine homophobia in each case study I will be using indicators of 
homophobia and of LGBT equality to both establish levels of homophobia in each state 
and key dates where changes in these indicators occurred. While, for the purposes of this 
paper, I broadly define homophobia as state, societal, or personal negative against 
persons for their actual or perceived homosexuality, here in my methodology I do 
distinguish where I examine state or societal homophobia. The indicators and the dates 
combined will establish where changes in LGBT rights have occurred in each of the case 
studies and when they occurred. The dating of these changes is key to my argument as it 
will establish when changes occurred in relation to changes in each states’ relationship 
with the EU. Changes motivated by the accession process and the prospect of becoming 
an EU member state will occur in the years immediately prior to reaching candidate 
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status or in the years between attaining candidate status and becoming an EU member. 
Because of the key role of timing in this argument in establishing causality between EU 
accession and LGBT rights I use timelines to illustrate the way in which timing is key to 
the LGBT rights changes in each case, in comparison to changes in EU accession 
policies.  
 Establishing changes in policy indicators of homophobia or LGBT equality is a 
fairly simple process. Typically, policy can be traced back to a day of enactment or a 
voting day where there is a clear line between “before the policy” and “after the policy.” 
When the change happens is distinct in matters of policy. When it comes to measuring 
and tracking societal change, however, things become much more complicated. There are 
no such distinct lines in examining societal feelings on the LGBT community. The 
quality of the most straightforward measure of societal opinion, surveys on questions 
around LGBT rights, vary greatly in quality, precise topic, geographic area of study, 
sample size, and regularity. Additionally, because there is no single survey which covers 
all four of the case in this paper this variation in surveys is an additional challenge.  
Public accommodation or societal acceptance can also be examined through other 
measures such as rates of hate crimes or rates of experienced discrimination, however, 
while higher rates of negative feelings towards LGBT persons leads to greater rates of 
hate crimes and other forms of discrimination it also leads to a decrease in reports of hate 
crimes and discrimination. Official statistics are therefore highly flawed and are not 
reflective of actual experiences of the LGBT community in that state. Statistics reported 
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through surveys conducted by independent organizations can be more reflective of actual 
conditions than official statistics, however they can still be influenced by underreporting 
and the methodology of the survey in question and the representativeness of the sample 
should be considered. Ultimately, any form of societal analysis available to me in this 
project will be deeply flawed.  
Because policy analysis alone is too limited to adequately examine homophobia, I 
will use limited analysis of societal change to further address the influence of the EU on 
LGBT rights. By using ratings for each case from the International Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Association (ILGA) in areas of asylum, equality and non-
discrimination, family, hate crime and hate speech, legal gender recognition and bodily 
integrity, and civil society space, I will evaluate present day conditions for the LGBT 
community in conjunction with the changes over time for each case. I chose the ILGA 
scores because, based on my research, it was the only source which included non-
legislative measures of homophobia which was reliable and consistent for all four cases.  
Section 2: The Cases  
 In order to understand the conditions and circumstances which shape human 
rights, politics, and EU relations it is important to understand and consider the political 
and geographic background of the cases and the EU’s background in relation to 
fundamental rights, including LGBT rights. This section aims to lay out the necessary 
background needed to understand the central argument of this paper, regarding what 
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makes the relationship between EU accession and LGBT rights momentum particularly 
interesting in the former Yugoslav states.  
2.1 LGBT Rights in Yugoslavia 
 While other Eastern Bloc countries, and their LGBT citizens, were separated from 
the growing LGBT movement in “the West,” Yugoslavia’s comparatively open borders 
allowed gay and lesbian Yugoslavs to be exposed to and influenced by LGBT 
movements in Europe and North America (Kuhar 2014, 136). Despite its openness, 
however, Yugoslavia was by no means a gay oasis. As Irene Dioli (2011) states, “within 
the country’s dominant culture—not an exception to the repression and domestication of 
sexuality shared by communist systems—a rhetorical emphasis of hegemonic masculinity 
stigmatized male homosexuality as an expression of weakness, while a general erasure of 
female sexuality and pleasure virtually canceled female homosexuality from the picture” 
(313). This was demonstrated in Yugoslavia’s penal code, which criminalized male 
homosexual anal sex acts,3 but did not include female homosexual sex acts (Dioli 2011, 
314). The criminalization of homosexuality in Yugoslavia did not necessarily lead to 
widespread legal persecution of LGBT Yugoslavs; it did connect to the stigma and 
marginalization of Yugoslavia’s LGBT community. As a result of the disconnect between 
the criminalization of homosexuality and persecution, the decriminalization of 
homosexuality in some Yugoslav Republics and Vojvodina (an autonomous province 
                                               
3 Homosexual anal sex acts were criminalized until 1977 in Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, and the Serbian 
province Vojvodina and until 1994 in all other former Yugoslav Republics. 
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within Serbia) in the late 1970s, did not decrease persecution and discrimination against 
the LGBT community in Yugoslavia (Kuhar 2014, 135-136).  
The conflicts of the 1990s and the associated rise in nationalism and 
traditionalism meant that what limited space and tolerance had been granted to LGBT 
Yugoslavs disappeared. Where the LGBT community had gained visibility in the 1980s, 
they were then targeted for violence. The city of Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia, had 
been particularly open to the LGBT community in Yugoslavia and developed visible 
LGBT spaces. However, in the early 90s these spaces were targeted by neo-Nazi and 
other nationalist groups (Kuhar 2014, 137). The aftermath of the violent disintegration of 
Yugoslavia and the economic and social crises of the 1990s triggered a re-
traditionalization process in the mid to late 1990s and early 2000s. There was a “re-
patriarchialization” of family values and in the ideals around gender roles. In nationalist 
and patriarchal ideals anyone outside the hyper-masculine male or maternal women ran 
counter to nationalist ideology around the biological continuation of the nation. While 
Yugoslavia had never necessarily been “gay-friendly,” with the growth in nationalism 
and traditionalism, homophobia grew in the former Yugoslav states (Dioli 2011, 313-
315).4  
 
 
                                               
4 For more on the connections between nationalism and homophobia see section 3.1 
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2.2 Case Studies 
 Yugoslavia, literally “the land of Southern Slavs,” in its first iteration, was formed 
following post-World War One breakup of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. 
In the Second World War, the Croatian Fascist Ustaše, Nazi Germany, and Fascist Italy 
occupied Yugoslavia. Josip Broz Tito led the Communist Partisans in occupied 
Yugoslavia who, in partnership with the royalist Chetniks, liberated Yugoslavia. 
Following the Second World War, Yugoslavia, under Tito and the Communist Party’s 
leadership, became the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia.5 Tito remained 
Yugoslavia’s leader until his death in 1980. Following his death, Yugoslavia assumed a 
system of collective presidency where a new president assumed the role each year as a 
representative of their respective republic. Slobodan Milošević became the President of 
the League of Communists of Serbia in 1986 and became President the Socialist Republic 
of Serbia in 1989.6 In 1991 Milošević blocked the election of the Croatian President to 
the collective presidency and Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence just a few 
months later triggering the breakup of Yugoslavia. While Slovenia and Serbia’s conflict 
lasted for 10 days, aptly named “the Ten Days War,” Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia’s 
bloody conflict would continue until the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995. As 
the republics declared their independence Yugoslavia shrank into “Rump Yugoslavia,” 
consisting of Montenegro and Serbia, including Serbia’s two autonomous provinces 
Vojvodina and Kosovo.  
                                               
5 Changed to Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1963 
6 The Socialist Republic of Serbia became the Republic of Serbia in 1991. 
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Tensions in Kosovo, already on the rise since Tito’s death, grew under 
Milošević’s repressive leadership. The situation escalated in the early to mid-1990s as 
Milošević first segregated the education of Serb and Albanian students in Kosovo and 
eventually barred all Albanian students and teachers from all levels of education. 
Milošević also fired nearly all ethnic Albanians in government employment causing 
widespread unemployment among Kosovar Albanians. Violence escalated and the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was formed. Eventually the violence and ethnic-
cleansing of Kosovar Albanians escalated to the point where the international community 
feared the war in Kosovo would resemble the violence and ethnic-cleansing of Bosnia. 
NATO intervened with a months-long bombing campaign in 1999 which eventually 
ended the conflict. Kosovo received assistance through the United Nations Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) until 2008 and by NATO through the peacekeeping Kosovo Force 
(KFOR) mission. In 2008 Kosovo officially declared their independence from Serbia and 
later that year the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) began.  
 Of the four cases included in this paper, Slovenia sits as both the northernmost 
and the wealthiest; Kosovo is the southernmost and poorest. In September 2018 Slovenia 
had an unemployment rate of 7.8 percent, while Kosovo had an unemployment rate of 
30.7 percent (“Slovenia Unemployment Rate” 2019; “Kosovo - Economic Indicators” 
2019). There are also significant linguistic and religious differences across the four cases. 
Slovenia predominantly speaks Slovenian and Kosovar Albanians speak Albanian. 
Beyond the use of the Cyrillic alphabet in Serbian, there are no significant differences 
15 
 
between Serbian and Croatian languages (once referred to as Serbo-Croatian, the official 
language of Yugoslavia). Slovenia and Croatia are predominantly Catholic, Serbia is 
predominantly Serbian Orthodox, and Kosovar Albanians are predominantly Muslim 
with a Catholic minority.  
 Slovenia was the first of the former Yugoslav states to become an EU member in 
2004. Croatia joined them as a member in 2013. Serbia is currently a candidate for EU 
membership and has been since 2012. Kosovo’s situation is more unique. While not a 
candidate for EU membership, Kosovo became a potential candidate for EU membership 
after they signed onto the Stabilization and Association Agreement and the agreement 
went into force in 2016.  
 The four cases in this project demonstrate four different situations for LGBT 
rights which are perhaps best illustrated through examples of how each state’s unique 
context plays out with regards to LGBT rights. In 2016, the blog Two Bad Tourists 
published an article titled “Why Gay Travelers Should Start Heading to Slovenia.” The 
article posed two central arguments: one, that Slovenia was an underappreciated tourism 
destination with beautiful natural wonders, easy day trips, and excellent food and wine; 
the second, that Slovenia “is proving itself to be a country of the times” and becoming 
more and more “gay-friendly” by the day (“Why Gay Travelers…” 2016). Slovenia is the 
only of the former Yugoslav states to recognize same-sex marriage following a 
parliamentary vote in 2016 which introduced same-sex marriage without rights to 
adoption or in-vitro fertilization for same-sex couples. This was after the Slovenian 
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public rejected same-sex marriage (without restrictions) in a 2015 referendum on the 
issue.  
 In a December 2013 referendum supported by the Catholic Church, Croatia voted 
65% in favor of defining marriage as between one man and one woman. Less than one 
year later, in 2014 Croatia’s parliament passed the “Croatia’s Life Partnership Act” 
which granted same-sex couples many of the rights granted in, except the rights to joint 
adoption and in-vitro fertilization. Croatia’s LGBT community still faces marginalization 
in other areas. In 2017, teargas was thrown into an LGBT nightclub in Zagreb and, in 
2018, a copy of the, then newly released, Croatian picture book “My Rainbow Family” 
was burned at a pre-Lent event (Vladisavljevic 2018). Still, for the region Croatia has 
made a lot of progress around LGBT rights since their independence. Over the course of 
Croatia’s EU accession process, they didn’t just meet the requirements around LGBT 
rights, they actually exceeded them (Slootmaeckers et al. 2016, 29).  
 In contrast to Slovenia and Croatia Serbia has no form of same-sex partnership 
recognition. Until recently, Serbia’s government regularly canceled Pride events on the 
grounds of safety and security, a strategy used throughout Eastern Europe to provide an 
illusion of supporting Pride events by allowing them to be planned without allowing them 
to take place. However, safety is indeed a concern for the LGBT community in Serbia 
around public events. Belgrade’s 2010 Pride Parade, which was allowed to take place, 
was met with violence against participants and police.  
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Serbia is the only of the former Yugoslav states to have an openly gay leader. Ana 
Brnabić was appointed to the position of Prime Minister by President Vučić in 2017 
making her both the first female and first openly gay person individual to hold that office. 
An openly gay leader is a rarity not only in the Balkans but globally as well. In February 
2019, Brnabić’s partner gave birth to their first child despite restrictions on same-sex 
adoption. Second parent adoption is not an option for same-sex couples in Serbia and 
same-sex couples must seek artificial insemination abroad as Serbia has no options for 
the donation of reproductive material. Prime Minister Brnabić, despite her symbolic 
firsts, is not considered a spokesperson by the LGBT community. She has rarely spoken 
out about LGBT rights in Serbia and once stated that she did not believe Serbia is a 
homophobic country (Zivanovic 2019).  
 As Kosovo began to build its independence with assistance from the international 
community in the early 2000s, Kosovo introduced rights and legislation that theoretically 
protected LGBT Kosovars. The Law on Discrimination, passed in 2004, barred 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. However, leaders of LGBT organization 
have stated that the MPs voting on these decisions understood neither the legislation they 
were voting for nor LGBT rights (Morina 2016). It is because of situations like this that 
Kosovo uniquely lacks clarity on the issue of same-sex marriage. LGBT activists argue 
that Kosovo’s Constitution permits same-sex marriage; Article 37 of Kosovo’s 
Constitution grants the right of marriage to all. However, Article 14 of the Constitution, 
the Law on Family, specifies that marriage is between those of different sexes. 
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Additionally, no same-sex marriage has ever been legally recognized in Kosovo and there 
have been no legal challenges (Morina 2017). Not all is bleak for LGBT rights in 
Kosovo. Kosovo had its first Pride events in October 2017, successfully followed by their 
second Pride in October 2018.  
2.3 LGBT Rights and the European Union  
 In recent years fundamental values have become increasingly important to the 
EU’s narrative. The idea of the European Union as a defender of certain fundamental 
rights, or basic rights inherently owed to all persons, has grown in importance internally 
as well as in its foreign and enlargement policies. As the EU looked to expand to the 
former communist states of Eastern Europe following the fall of the Iron Curtain Europe 
had to consider its approach to enlargement concerning human rights in those states. The 
foundational documents of the EU gave it a platform, beginning in the 2000s, to herald 
the rising importance of fundamental rights. Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, 
as amended by later treaties, states,  
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the 
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail (European 
Council 2007). 
Article 49 goes on to require that all new Member States adhere to these tenants 
(European Council 2007). These articles are the central places where ideas of equality 
and tolerance as necessary for EU membership are expanded upon in other areas of EU 
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law. As the notion of fundamental rights has grown in importance the accession process 
has changed to bring these rights and the development of these rights into the fold. In 
1993 the Copenhagen European Council summit issued the Copenhagen criteria which 
firmly established a set of criteria for EU accession which included criteria that the states 
must guarantee human rights and must accept established EU law and practices 
(Slootmaeckers and Touquet 2016, 24; “Conditions for Membership” 2016).  
What is significant to this thesis is that this increase in prominence of 
fundamental rights has coincided with the increasing attention to LGBT human rights in 
Europe. As Slootmaeckers and Touquet (2016) point out, “being ‘gay-friendly’ has now 
become a symbol for what it means to be European and vice versa. And with this 
evolution an important mechanism for transforming candidate member states into 
countries ready (and worthy) to become a member of the EU and take up the 
responsibilities of such membership, including respect for LGBT rights” (20).  
While the criteria make no mention of the LGBT community, the Copenhagen 
criteria, by introducing mandate on EU law, indirectly mandated the decriminalization of 
homosexual sex acts and the equalization of ages of consent, so that ages of consent for 
homosexual and heterosexual sex acts are the same, in new member states. The 
Copenhagen criteria also moved the accession process and the compliance with accession 
requirements from a categorical approach, with states that were either complying or not, 
to a negotiation-based process where requirements for accession and a state’s compliance 
was monitored and evaluated regularly (Slootmaeckers and Touquet 2016, 24). While 
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LGBT rights were not a central tenet of the Copenhagen criteria, the Copenhagen criteria 
were the first among many steps in introducing LGBT rights as a requirement for EU 
accession.  
 In November 2000, the European Council published Council Directive 
2000/78/EC, which prohibited “any direct or indirect discrimination based on religion or 
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation” in employment. It was the first document or 
declaration in the EU explicitly banning discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation and, as a result of the directive and the Copenhagen criteria, candidate states 
were now mandated to adopt legislation protecting Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual (LGB) 
persons from discrimination in employment (European Council 2000; Slootmaeckers and 
Touquet 2016, 24).  
 Fundamental rights, as they were growing in importance in the early 2000s, 
became an official and key piece of pre-accession negotiations in 2005, when the 
European Commission amended enlargement policies by introducing Chapter 23, a 
chapter on the judiciary and fundamental rights, to the acquis. Chapter 23 moved 
fundamental rights from a precondition to begin accession negotiations to a central piece 
of those negotiations to be monitored throughout the accession process (Slootmaeckers 
and Touquet 2016, 25).  
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2.4 Alternative Explanation: Religion 
 As I make the case that EU accession explains the variations in LGBT human 
rights in the former Yugoslav states, I see it as vital to address other factors which can 
influence the prevalence or scarcity of homophobia in a given state or society. There are 
several alternative explanations surrounding the causes and explanations of homophobia 
that I believe are relevant but fail to explain the variations in homophobia across the four 
cases in this project. In the remainder of this section I lay out three primary alternative 
explanations for these variations: religion, nationalism, and global changes and explain 
why I believe they do not adequately explain the changes in homophobia across the 
former Yugoslav states. Examples from across the four cases provide further evidence as 
to the inadequacy of these explanations.  
 In the world at large, but in Central and Eastern Europe specifically, religion and 
religious adherence are often used to explain higher levels of homophobia and resistance 
to LGBT rights. Scholars emphasize the link between religion and homophobia through 
conservatism. There is a high correlation between religiosity and conservatism and 
between conservatism and homophobia. The values promoted through religiosity are 
shared in conservatism and a piece of these values can often be restrictive views on 
gender and sex. In this way religion and homophobia are often tied to each other. (Mole 
2016, 109). In some states this proves to be an adequate primary explanation for 
homophobia but in the former Yugoslav state religion and religiosity does not explain 
variation in homophobia.  
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Variations in religiosity do not align with variations in homophobia across the 
region. The case of Kosovo is a particularly strong illustration of how the religiosity-
homophobia correlation does not align. While Kosovo is considered the most 
homophobic of the former Yugoslav states, it is relatively secular. Even after the end of 
Yugoslavia, it has remained difficult to obtain reliable data on religion in Kosovo; based 
on approximations of the Albanian population in Albania scholars have made estimates 
for the Albanian population in Kosovo. Somewhere between 67 and 75 percent of 
Kosovo Albanians are Muslim or from a Muslim background. The remaining 25 to 33 
percent are Catholic or Orthodox or from a Catholic or Orthodox background (Judah 
2008, 7-8). Views on religion in Kosovo are, as a trend, more relaxed than in other 
Balkan states. Religion in Kosovo has largely resisted conservatism; following the 
collapse of communism there were attempts at proselytizing more conservative forms of 
Islam in Kosovo which largely failed. Islam is not as central to the Kosovar Albanian 
identity in the same way, for example, the Serbian Orthodox Church is to the Serb 
identity.  
Croatia, where Catholicism is tied to the nation, provides a useful comparison to 
Kosovo. The importance of the Catholic Church to the idea of the nation and to society is 
used to further justify, along with the nationalist arguments around reproduction and 
threats to the nation described in Section 3. The Catholic Church in Croatia, as an 
important identifier of the Croat nation, is closely linked to the Croatian Far-Right (as the 
Serbian Orthodox Church is linked to the nationalist Far-Right in Serbia) (Jovanović 
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2018, 82-83). As Jovanović argues, using evidence from the nationalist and homophobic 
Croatian website Narod, homophobia perpetuated by Croatians on Narod is tied to 
ideology of the Catholic Church and the idea of the Croat nation’s ties to the Catholic 
Church. Homophobia is also often perpetuated at important national religious events. For 
example, the burning of “my rainbow family” picture book at a popular pre-Lent event 
(Vladisavljevic 2018). While Croatia does possess homophobic legislation and has an 
anti-LGBT far-right, Croatia is among the least homophobic, with Slovenia, of the former 
Yugoslav states. With homophobia’s ties to Catholicism in Croatia and the importance of 
religion in Croatia, as compared to more secular states in the region such as Kosovo, a 
lack of or lower degree of religiosity in Croatia cannot be used to explain its lesser degree 
of homophobia.  
These ties between homophobia, religion, and nationalism connected to religion 
are also evident in Slovenia and Serbia. In Serbia local LGBT activists maintain that the 
connection between the Serbian Orthodox church and homophobic rhetoric and beliefs is 
very strong. The roots of anti-LGBT sentiment in the church reinforces the legitimacy of 
homophobic speech and violence (Milosevic 2011). The same is true in Slovenia where 
the Catholic Church, as an institution, has taken strong stands against homosexuality and 
legislation to improve LGBT human rights including same-sex marriage. Church leaders 
in Slovenia have made public statements that the Catholic Church cannot accept 
homosexuality and that LGBT persons must “purify” themselves (“The Social Situation 
Concerning Homophobia…” 2009, 8) 
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This difference in connection to religion in Kosovo and the unusual amount of 
religious diversity among Kosovo Albanians, as compared to their Balkan peers, can be 
traced back to the lack of ties between the Albanian identity and religion. Whereas Serb 
identity is clearly associated with the Serbian Orthodox Church and Croat identity and 
Slovene identity are clearly associated with the Catholic Church, the same is not true for 
Albanians. National identity and nationalism have ties to religion throughout the Balkans, 
with Kosovar Albanians as an exception. As 19th century poet Pashko Vasa wrote, “the 
religion of Albanians is Albanianism” (Judah 2008, 8-9). Because of Kosovo 
Albanianism’s relatively loose ties to religion, Kosovo’s high degree of homophobia 
cannot be traced to high levels of religiosity. Religion does not serve here as an adequate 
explanation of Kosovo’s high levels of homophobia.   
In some cases, religion can be a useful explanation for homophobia to social 
scientists. However, in my opinion, the cases of the former Yugoslav states cannot be 
adequately explained with religion or religiosity. Even if homophobia in some states may 
be linked to religion, religion fails to explain the variation between the states. As related 
to the diffusion of LGBT norms globally Ayoub states, “the LGBT norm has permeated 
different domestic contexts at different rates. For example, some traditionally Catholic 
countries blaze new trails on LGBT rights, while some modern, wealthy democracies 
remain laggards” (2016, 10). Therefore, while many states do see the prominent role of 
religion in their own homophobia, the fact that religion is not a central explanation of 
homophobia in the former Yugoslav state does not necessarily make them unusual. 
25 
 
2.5 Alternative Explanation: Nationalism and EU Accession  
 An additional alternative explanation for the variations in homophobia observed 
in the former Yugoslav states is Nationalism. It could be that EU member states are less 
homophobic, not because of the influence of the European Union, but because states with 
lesser rates of nationalism, which as a trend will be less homophobic, will be more likely 
to reach EU accession than states which are more nationalist. However, I argue that 
prevalence of nationalism among states within the European Union, including Slovenia 
and Croatia, demonstrates that this is not an adequate explanation of variations in 
homophobia in the former Yugoslav states.  
 Slovenia provides a useful case to demonstrate the ability of states with large 
nationalist constituencies, which result in the enactment of nationalist policies or policies 
supported by nationalist, to become EU member states. Slovenia joined the EU in May of 
2004; in April of 2004 Slovenia passed legislation, via referendum, which denied rights 
of residency to those from the other former Yugoslav states. The campaign for the 
referendum was led by the far-right opposition, and, while the debate around the 
referendum did include some discussion around financial implications, the debate 
centered on the questionable loyalty to Slovenia of persons from other former Yugoslav 
states (Lungescu 2004). At the time of the referendum Slovenia was set to join the EU the 
following month, demonstrating that states with powerful and vocal nationalist 
constituencies can still become EU member states.   
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 EU member states are not immune from nationalism and EU integration does not 
inherently counter nationalist projects or sentiments within candidate states. States with 
strong nationalist constituencies have and continue to successfully become EU member 
states. While Europeanization and nationalism cannot be isolated from each other, 
nationalism does not prevent states from becoming EU members (Csergo and Goldgeier 
2004). This is evident in the example of Slovenia above. While there are factors that 
connect nationalism and homophobia, the fact remains that there is little connection 
between nationalism and EU membership. Nationalism cannot explain the correlation 
between EU membership and homophobia in the former Yugoslav states.  
While nationalism is a contributing factor and indicator of homophobia, as argued 
in section 3, the norm diffusion of the accession process directly targets LGBT norms and 
incentives provided by the prospect of EU accession allows states to justify official (if 
symbolic) moves toward LGBT rights while justifying their actions to nationalist 
constituencies. EU accession, while possessing standards on LGBT rights, does not 
possess limitations on the existence of nationalist political groups (although the 
legislation they promote may violate accession conditions). Therefore, I observe that 
nationalism, while it can be linked to homophobia, does not serve as an adequate 
explanation for the variations in homophobia in the Balkans.  
2.6 Alternative Explanation: Global Trends 
 Since the late 1990s and early 2000s there have been significant global shifts with 
regards to LGBT rights. Even states with some of the most severe laws have moved 
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towards decriminalization in this period. Therefore, we might expect that changes with 
regards to LGBT rights would be as a consequence of broader global trends with regards 
to LGBT rights, particularly as they moved away from the Yugoslav period and 
communism towards democratization. Despite what one might expect, evidence shows 
that these trends do not necessarily universally apply, particularly in Central and Eastern 
Europe.  
 A Pew Research survey found there is a great deal of divide between Western 
Europe and Central and Eastern Europe with regards to LGBT rights. Where most 
individuals in Western Europe support same-sex marriage, most individuals in Central 
and Eastern Europe oppose same-sex marriage. There is very little state level variation 
when it comes to this trend. The only Central and Eastern European country they 
surveyed where a majority supported same-sex marriage was the Czech Republic. There 
were no Western European countries in their survey where a majority opposed same-sex 
marriage (“Eastern and Western Europeans Differ…” 2018).  
 A variation in support for same-sex marriage does not necessarily prove that 
global shifts have not spread to Central and Eastern Europe. With just the information I 
included above, there remains the possibility that rather than being outside these trends 
Central and Eastern Europe following these trends but simply lag behind Western 
Europe. This leaves open the possibility of future change in LGBT rights across Central 
and Eastern Europe. If the trends of change are influential in Central and Eastern Europe 
with the region simply lagging behind Western Europe there should be generational 
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changes evident in the population. If these changes are occurring young people should 
show significantly more LGBT friendly views than older generations.  What Pew found, 
however, was there is little different between young adults and older adults in Central and 
Eastern Europe with regards to same-sex marriage. Because of the lack of generational 
different Pew specifies that they anticipate little change in the immediate future as 
younger generations grow older. This doesn’t necessarily mean that Central and Eastern 
Europe is totally separated from global shifts with regards to LGBT rights, but it does 
mean that changes in Central and Eastern Europe are not as a result of global shifts as 
polling indicates a resistance to global shifts (“Western and Eastern Europeans Differ…” 
2018). Central and Eastern Europe is not immune from global changes, particularly those 
propagated by social media and increased global connectivity. While these findings do 
not indicate future changes, at least in the immediate future, there remains the possibility 
that as the substance and means of these global shifts on LGBT rights changes the 
receptivity of Central and Eastern Europe to global shifts may also change.  
Section 3: The Literature 
 The central argument of this paper is that the process of Europeanization 
encourages states to make progress on LGBT rights where they otherwise would not. The 
literature comes at this idea from a number of angles including the relationship between 
nationalism in the Balkans and homophobia, and how that connects to perceptions of the 
EU both with and without aspirations of EU membership, how Europeanization impacts 
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norm diffusion, and how Europeanization decreases political risks of supporting LGBT 
rights to states.  
3.1 Nationalism and Homophobia  
 Scholars resoundingly find a connection between nationalism and homophobia. 
This is notable because of the remarkably high levels of both nationalism and 
homophobia in many Central and Eastern European states including the Balkans. In an 
article on homophobia in Latvia, Richard Mole (2011) argues Latvia has uniquely high 
levels of homophobia because in Latvia homosexuality “is seen as a threat to the 
continued existence of the nation” (541). In nations which define themselves in terms of 
ethnicity, reproduction becomes increasingly important to the national narrative. These 
states are more likely to ascribe to patriarchal family values with strict gender roles 
(2011, 548). As Mole describes in his chapter of The EU Enlargement and Gay Politics: 
The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on Rights, Activism and Prejudice,  
The ethnic continuity of the nation is maintained by means of the patriarchal 
family, underpinned by heteronormative and patriarchal conceptions of 
masculinity and femininity. The most important role that women can play in the 
nation is that of the mother, producing sons (and daughters) for the nation and 
inculcating in them the ethnic language and culture, while men act as defenders 
and decision makers (2016, 105).  
This is a structure in which homosexuality defies nationalist standards for gendered 
behavior and, therefore, represents a threat to the nation. Because of the framing of the 
nation and homosexuality as mutually exclusive, nationalism is tied directly to 
homophobia (Mole 2011; Mole 2016, 105). Building off of Mole’s arguments that to 
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nationalists homosexuality presents a threat to the continuity of the nation. Gould and 
Moe (2015) outline the connection between homophobia, nationalism, and the 
international community from the 1990s to 2008 in Serbia.  
 In the early 1990s as the Yugoslav wars began Milošević’s regime promoted 
patriarchal gender norms of individuals relationship to the nation as part of the regime’s 
nationalist rhetoric. As Gould and Moe describe, “the regime championed a patriarchal, 
ethno-sexual frontier in which Serbian men were expected to protect a nation under siege 
from hostile ethnic enemies that were–at least initially–largely of the regime’s own 
invention” (2015, 276). Because, under threat from perceived fertile national enemies, 
nationalism in Balkan states placed an emphasis on procreation (Mole 2016). This placed 
homosexuality outside what Gould and Moe describe as the “ethno-sexual frontier,” it 
was useful to the regime to link the international community with homosexuality. 
Homophobia in this case was a rhetorical resource for the regime. Because they were able 
to connect NGOs, foreign embassies, aid organizations, and political opponents to 
homosexuality, the regime was able to also portray these groups as similarly counter the 
nation (Gould and Moe 2015, 278).  
 The established link between internationals and sexual minorities, placing the 
international community including the ICTY and the EU beyond the “ethno-sexual 
frontier,” tied their fates. Following 2005, Serbia began to develop further interest in 
completing the accession process, which it had already began a few years earlier without 
much action towards meeting EU standards for accession. The new government, 
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following the fall of Milošević, was at least symbolically invested to reforming human 
rights for the LGBT community. However, this shift in government and investment in 
becoming an EU member state marked a change in allegiances somewhat away from 
nationalist interests and institutions (Gould and Moe 2015). In 2009, when a bishop in the 
Serbian Orthodox Church, an institution which routinely promotes Serb nationalist 
values, successfully removed protections for LGBT persons from anti-discrimination 
legislation just hours before it was scheduled to be voted upon in Serbia’s parliament. 
However, activists were able to secure a delay for the vote. International and domestic 
activists and organizations embarked on a lobbying campaign which successful returned 
LGBT protections to the legislation before it passed its parliamentary vote (2015, 279-
281). Though nationalist rhetoric undermined international institutions, as EU accession 
became increasingly appealing and human rights for sexual minorities became a standard 
for EU accession, this connection began to serve Serbia’s LGBT community.  
3.2 Norm Diffusion and the EU Accession Process 
 Norm diffusion is the adoption, by a state, of standards of a community. Norms 
spread from states where they are accepted to states where they are not. States are 
influenced by outside actors or states to adopt new norms which they would not without 
such influence (Ayoub 2017, 6-7). Norm diffusion can manifest through action, such as 
government policies; lack of negative action, such as a lack of retaliation to events which 
would have elicited retaliation in the past; or negative attention due to increased 
awareness overall, such as counter protests on an issue that received little to no attention 
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in the past (Swimelar 2017, 915). Ayoub (2016) describes Latvia’s first pride in 2005 in 
Riga as an example of this last phenomenon. Scholars studying norm diffusion and 
Europeanization have argued that through the accession process norms diffuse into 
“formal and informal rules during the creation of shared beliefs through a combination of 
rational external incentives, social learning, and identity shifts” (Ayoub 2016, 7; 
Swimelar 2017, 915).  
 Ayoub (2016) argues that Europeanization serves norm diffusion of LGBT rights 
through its contributions to visibility norms. In a country without norms around LGBT 
acceptance it can be a difficult and dangerous proposal for a LGBT individual to be “out” 
in that community, so these individuals are invisible. However, research shows that 
having exposure to LGBT individuals makes a person much more likely to accept the 
LGBT community generally. Invisibility can keep an individual safe as an individual, 
however it suppresses domestic movements This is the reason LGBT groups and activists 
have advocated for coming-out as a mechanism for furthering visibility and LGBT 
norms. Transnational actors, without the risks which might hold an individual back from 
acting, can be an external source of visibility which can normalize LGBT identities and 
individuals. Transnational visibility can also create connections between LGBT 
movements across borders creating a solidarity which can strengthen LGBT movements 
within states without well-established norms for LGBT rights (23-31).  
 Ayoub also argues that Europeanization facilitates the diffusion of LGBT norms 
through a few processes. First, the EU imposes requirements and expectations around 
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LGBT rights on member states, which increases the opportunity for local organizations to 
influence domestic government institutions. Second, Europeanization creates an 
environment which grows networks of transnational activism which exposes actors in 
new member states to actors in other member states. Finally, there is so much 
mobilization around LGBT rights among existing member states that “EU-level frames 
and elites” and their mechanisms of socialization go along with this mobilization (2016, 
54-86). In essence, Europeanization creates opportunity for domestic actors on LGBT 
rights to both influence local institutions and to connect with actors outside the state. It 
creates mechanisms for both the connection of higher-level institutions for norm 
diffusion and the development opportunities for local level organizations and activists to 
facilitate this norm diffusion.  
 Swimelar (2017) compares the norm diffusion processes in Bosnia and Serbia to 
examine the relationship between the Europeanization process and the diffusion of norms 
around LGBT rights. She argues that Serbia, which has EU candidate status and is 
becoming increasingly focused on EU membership, has seen more norm diffusion since 
the 1990s because of its faster paced Europeanization process than Bosnia, which does 
not have candidate status and is not experiencing Europeanization in the same way. In 
Serbia this norm diffusion is visible through the granting of permits to Pride Parades, the 
passage of anti-discrimination and other pro-LGBT legislation, and the creation of 
government programs for the LGBT community (2017). The process of Europeanization 
creates external incentives for this norm diffusion in the form of the economic, social, 
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and political benefits Serbia would receive as an EU member state to bring about that 
norm diffusion. Being in the process of becoming an EU member allows norms of LGBT 
rights to better spread from the EU to the candidate state than if the state in question was 
at an earlier in the process (2017). Swimlear establishes a link between the process of 
Europeanization, including the degree of Europeanization, and diffusion of norms on 
LGBT rights.  
Beyond norm diffusion, Europeanization expands LGBT through the balancing of 
accession requirements and the incentives of EU membership. Europeanization can be an 
opportunity for states to expand the human rights of sexual minorities while appeasing 
nationalist constituencies with the benefits of EU membership (Slootmaecker et al. 2016, 
3; Mikuš 2011, 841-842). Mikuš (2011) argues that Serbia’s government was able to 
permit the 2010 Belgrade Pride and form a sort of political alliance with the organizers, 
framed by the context of Europeanization which then both served to create public space 
for Serbia’s LGBT community and further reinforced nationalist perceptions of LGBT 
human rights as foreign. This is strategic both for the state and for the parade organizers. 
By intentionally using Serbia’s status as a candidate for EU membership to promote the 
parade to the state, organizers were able to secure permissions for the parade which had 
previously not been permitted due to government concerns around security (2011, 841-
842). At the same time, the state was able to endorse the parade and therefore support 
LGBT norms, at least rhetorically, without facing political repercussions from nationalist 
constituencies. Serbia’s government successfully used the connection between LGBT 
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norms and the international community, including the EU, to justify the parade as a part 
of the EU accession process.  
While the EU may still be outside the nation and sexual minorities a threat to the 
nation, the economic, social, and political benefits of EU membership are enough to 
justify state action to a nationalist base without facing significant political repercussions, 
as would have been the case in the early 2000s just after the fall of the Milošević regime 
(2011). Thus, without necessarily altering nationalist ideas of sexual minorities and the 
international community, the state is still able to move toward EU accession and its 
benefits and expand LGBT rights, at least symbolically.  
Section 4: Evidence and Argument 
The center of my argument is that when comparing the progress of these four 
former Yugoslav states to both the changes in enlargement policies as related to LGBT 
human rights and to each other in their individual timelines of EU accession there is a 
clear connection between EU accession and new, otherwise unexplained, progress on 
LGBT rights. The case of Croatia particularly demonstrates progress through the 
accession process; the case of Slovenia demonstrates progress as an EU member, having 
become an EU member state just as these new policies were being introduced. Serbia and 
Kosovo, at different places in the accession process, demonstrate the ongoing influence 
of these policies mid-accession process.  
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Slovenia’s case is slightly unique as compared to the other three cases. Slovenia 
became an EU member as the EU introduced new standards around LGBT human rights 
meaning that these new standards had little direct impact on Slovenia’s accession 
process. What is interesting about Slovenia’s case is examining the changes in LGBT 
human rights, comparable to Croatia’s changes before accession, which occurred after 
Slovenia became and EU member. Because of Slovenia’s unique timeline it is included 
following the other three cases in this section.  
4.1 Croatia 
 Croatia serves as an ultimate example of the shifts in approach to LGBT rights by 
governments following the introduction the incentive of EU membership. Because of the 
timing of Croatia’s EU accession such that Croatia’s accession process came just 
following the growth of fundamental rights in the accession negotiations, Croatia 
illustrates the possible progression for LGBT rights over the full course of the accession 
process from beginning to end. Croatia joined discussions of the EU’s eastern expansion 
just as LGBT rights were emerging into the forefront of enlargement discussions and 
their accession process and requirements were the first to include Chapter 23. Despite 
setbacks in the accession negotiations due to issues around Croatia’s compliance with the 
ICTY tribunal, which included a temporary closure of negotiations around Chapter 23, by 
Croatia became an EU member in 2013 it had exceeded the requirements on LGBT 
human rights (Slootmaeckers and Touquet 2016, 29). As Slootmaeckers and Touquet 
(2016) state, “After the opening of Chapter 23 in the EU negotiations (2009), LGBT 
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rights became a prominent political topic, and it was no longer possible for those in 
power to ignore the rights of the LGBT community, as these issues became part of the 
public debate” (29). Croatia’s entry into the EU accession process coincided with the 
growth of LGBT human rights in the accession process.  
 Croatia was the first state of the four cases to see LGBT rights become a 
prominent issue as a direct result of the promotion of LGBT rights by the EU in the 
accession process. This makes it the key case for examining new policies in the EU’s 
eastern enlargement. Figure 1 below offers a comparison of the development of LGBT 
rights as an important EU membership requirement and some of Croatia’s most 
significant legislative changes around LGBT rights. By observing the changes in EU 
accession expectations and policies in the lead up and early years of accession 
negotiations with Croatia we can see their impact in the changes introduced in Croatia in 
the lead up to 2013.  
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Figure 1: Croatia Timeline 
 
 What is clear is that while some discussions around LGBT rights and some 
progress around those rights had occurred prior to accession negotiations, once Croatia 
became a candidate state in 2004 and Chapter 23 was introduced in 2005 LGBT rights 
became a new priority. This gave LGBT and human rights NGOs power in policy making 
decisions and gave the government an incentive to improve LGBT human rights in a 
scenario where neglecting LGBT rights was no longer politically feasible (Slootmaeckers 
and Touquet 2016, 28-31). Shifts toward greater protections of LGBT human rights 
become increasingly frequent and more regular in the years following Croatia’s move to 
candidate status and leading up to Croatia’s membership in 2013.  
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 One important piece to understand when examining the timeline of changes for 
Croatia not only increases in changes once Croatia was persuing EU membership but also 
the types of changes they were making. Equalizing ages of consent or permitting Pride 
events are changes which are focused more on decriminalization of the LGBT 
community, whereas non-discrimination protections and the recognition of hate crimes 
based on sexual orientation are centered more on protection and inclusion of the LGBT 
community in wider society. The difference between these two types of changes is subtle, 
but it indicates a shift not just in the pace of change in accession process but also in the 
type of changes. 
 There are several instances where a shift in the pace of pro-LGBT legislation is 
particularly evident, as noted in figure 1 above. After Croatia became an EU candidate 
and began to face requirements around fundamental rights, which newly prioritized 
LGBT rights, Croatia made notable shifts in its policies. Two years after becoming a 
candidate, in 2006 Croatia began to recognize hate crimes based on sexual orientation 
and in 2008 Croatia introduced legal protections against discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation. Croatia also recognizes same-sex couples but does not recognize 
same-sex marriage. This is a notable difference between Croatia and Slovenia, who has 
recognized same-sex marriage since 2017. However, neither state permits same-sex 
couples’ joint adoption or in vitro fertilization rights (see 4.4 for more on Slovenia).  
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4.2 Serbia 
 Serbia, situated partway through the accession process, serves as a clear 
comparison point to Croatia. In 2019 Serbia is at a place where the incentives and desired 
endpoint are clear, and the first changes are being made with the explicit purpose of 
achieving the goal of EU membership. Serbia became an EU candidate in 2012 as the 
Eastern Enlargement was in full swing. By that time Chapter 23 LGBT rights were 
already established as a priority in accession negotiations. Where Croatia may be 
considered a test case for how fundamental rights might shape the relationship between 
EU accession and LGBT this is not case for Serbia. Still among the first states dealing 
with the inclusion of LGBT rights in accession, Croatia and other EU member states 
which were part of the earlier Eastern Enlargement have demonstrated how this change 
can shape the accession process from beginning to end. Today, Serbia is in the midst of 
its accession process and has far to go in the area of fundamental rights as well as in 
corruption, normalization of relations with Kosovo, and the economy (“Serbia 2018 
Report” 2018, 2-5). 
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Figure 2: Serbia Timeline 
 
 From the course of events before and after the EU granted Serbia candidate status, 
we can observe important changes to LGBT rights in the state. One trend which is 
particularly notable is the changes in policy related to Pride events in Serbia’s capital. 
While Serbia had its first Pride march in 2001 Serbia did not have another Pride until 
2010. Unfortunately, the 2010 event was marred by violence. Anti-LGBT protesters 
violently clashed with police, causing both extensive injury to both police and members 
of the public. Serbia had forced the cancellation of Pride events in 2009 and continued to 
cancel all Pride events after 2010, under the excuse of public safety, until 2014. The 
cancellations mark Serbia as a state reluctant to tackle LGBT rights. Rather take 
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measures to prevent violence, governments avoid public debate and succumb to political 
push-back from the far-right by not permitting the events under false pretenses. However, 
once Serbia was an EU candidate and facing requirements to progress on LGBT rights, 
there was a new incentive to allow Pride events to take place in Belgrade. Rather than 
avoid approaching LGBT rights politically and in public Serbia’s government had a 
greater incentive to, at least, make a show of new tolerance for LGBT rights and to open 
up public and political space for LGBT civil society at, perhaps, the expense of appeasing 
the far right. If Serbia wanted to continue to pursue EU membership, they had to make 
changes in their approach to Pride. Despite the government’s denials that the 
cancellations were a “capitulation to the hooligans,” the EU repeatedly condemned the 
cancellations (Vasovic 2013). There was no realistic scenario where Serbia could 
continue to cancel Pride and become an EU member, therefore, the prospect of EU 
accession motivated Serbia in 2014 to alter their approach to Pride.  
 These changes can also be tracked in the changing statements of the government 
in the EU accession process. President Vucić, in the early 2000s Serbian anger at the role 
of the international community in the Kosovo War, co-edited a book titled English Gay 
Fart Tony Blair (“The Changeling” 2016). Using homophobic rhetoric was common in 
Serbia during that period to discredit the international community. Now, Vucić attends 
Belgrade’s annual Pride March and promotes LGBT as necessary for Europeanization. 
Observers have noted just how much of the current government's actions around LGBT 
rights are motivated by a desire to appear LGBT-friendly to the EU (Byrne 2017). 
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 While, like Croatia, Serbia has been motivated to make changes to LGBT, Serbia 
lags behind member states Croatia and Slovenia with regards to the present state of 
LGBT rights. Where Croatia began their accession process in 2004 Serbia’s process 
began in 2012. This is reflected in the present context of LGBT rights in Serbia. Serbia 
has far fewer legal protections for the LGBT community than Croatia and Slovenia. For 
example, both Slovenia and Croatia legally recognize hate crimes based on sexual 
orientation, having passed the appropriate legislation in 2008 and 2006 respectively. 
Serbia does not have such recognitions of crimes motivated by homophobia. While other 
issues are of a greater priority for progress towards Serbia’s potential EU membership, 
normalizing Serbia-Kosovo relations for example, Serbia will have to expand LGBT 
human rights in order to qualify for membership.  
 In the European Commission’s 2018 report on Serbia protecting the LGBT 
community from discrimination was listed among the shortcomings in fundamental rights 
which still need to be addressed by Serbia (23). The report also stated that 2017 saw a 
small increase in violence targeted at LGBT persons while legal resources including 
prosecution continue to be inadequate, with Transgender individuals being particularly 
vulnerable and lacking support (28). As evident from the current state of LGBT rights, 
Serbia certainly has a lot of progress to make before they can meet EU standards of 
fundamental rights. From the progression Serbia has made since 2012, however, I believe 
that as long desire to join the EU remains strong LGBT rights will continue to improve in 
Serbia.  
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4.3 Kosovo  
Kosovo’s unique context for EU accession exemplifies the influence of potential 
EU membership specifically as well as just how dramatic and swift the changes in 
approach to LGBT rights can be. While Kosovo has a close relationship with the EU, 
Kosovo is still only a potential candidate for EU membership, further from potential 
future membership than Serbia, which has candidate status. Kosovo gained its potential 
candidate status after signing onto the Stabilization and Association Agreement, a part of 
the EU Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) with the countries of the Western 
Balkans. Kosovo has a unique relationship with the European Union particularly through 
the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) which launched in 2008 
following Kosovo’s declaration of independence. The mission of EULEX is to assist in 
creating sustainable and independent rule of law in Kosovo and its current mandate goes 
through 2020. While Kosovo is farther from EU accession than Serbia, its unique 
relationship provides interesting insight.  
However close Kosovo is with the EU, there is still a long way to go before it can 
reach EU membership. Kosovo has a weak economy, a government barely ten years old, 
and lacks universal recognition of its independence even within the EU. There are many 
areas which are of a much greater interest in potential negotiations with the EU at the 
present, including ongoing disputes with Serbia, than LGBT rights. This, in combination 
with the fact that a National Democratic Institute (NDI) 2015 survey rated Kosovo the 
most homophobic country in the Balkans, provides context to help us understand 
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Kosovo’s trajectory with regards to LGBT human rights (“LGBTI Public Opinion Poll: 
Western Balkans” 2015). 
Figure 3: Kosovo Timeline 
 
 
 There are two key points to note on the timeline with regards to Kosovo’s 
relationship with the EU: the launch of EULEX in December 2008 and the Stabilization 
and Association Agreement went into force in Kosovo which went into effect in April 
2016 and Kosovo became a potential candidate for EU membership. EULEX is 
significant in marking the relationship between Kosovo and the EU. The Stabilization 
and Association Agreement, however, marks the movement of Kosovo towards future 
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EU membership and the introduction of future expectations in human rights. The 
agreement is most significant in examining the connection between Kosovo’s changing 
relationship with the EU and LGBT human rights. From the timeline, we can see that 
Kosovo made initial legal changes with regards to the equalization of the ages of consent 
for homosexual and heterosexual sex acts and the introduction of anti-discrimination 
legislation in the years between the Kosovo War and Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of 
independence from Kosovo, while Kosovo was under the administration of UNMIK.  
 In relation to the other three cases included in this paper, it is remarkable how 
recently and how swiftly Kosovo has changed its approach to LGBT human rights. While 
there were earlier changes under UNMIK administration, recent changes have been 
dramatic and far more internally direction (albeit with the motivation of relations with the 
EU). In just five years Kosovo went from having the 2012 launch party of a magazine 
which discussed LGBT sexuality and issues violently attacked to being able to hold Pride 
in 2017 without violence. This is a truly unprecedented shift particularly when compared 
to Serbia. While Kosovo and Serbia are in a similar place in early 2019 in terms of their 
legal accommodation of the LGBT community, Kosovo’s progression has been much 
more recent and in a much shorter time frame.  
 With regards to Kosovo, it is impossible to separate the progress on LGBT rights 
at a legislative level from the influence of the international community, particularly the 
EU. While, because of the continuous presence of the international community in Kosovo 
since 1999, it is impossible to isolate pre-influence and post-influence timeframes with 
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regards to LGBT rights the consequences of potential EU membership for Kosovo’s 
human rights record are clear. Similar to Serbia, the benefits of EU membership would be 
extremely beneficial. Not only would membership give Kosovo the typical economic and 
political benefits it would also give them international legitimacy that they currently lack. 
While not yet an official EU membership candidate, the incentives are certainly there for 
Kosovo to continue to make progress in LGBT human rights.  
4.4 Slovenia 
 Slovenia’s timing with regards to EU membership and the introduction of LGBT 
rights into the accession process is such that it is not the ideal illustration of how the new 
focus on fundamental rights shapes candidate states. Still, the progress Slovenia has made 
since obtaining membership does give a hint as to the influence of these changes outside 
the accession process. Slovenia was the first former Yugoslav state to successfully join 
the EU, completing the process just as LGBT rights were becoming important in the EU 
accession process. As a result, LGBT rights emerged as an important requirement when 
Slovenia was already well into its own accession process. For this reason, Slovenia does 
not necessarily serve as a good example of the impact of the prioritization of LGBT 
rights in the accession process. I still include Slovenia as a case study in this project 
because as the first former Yugoslav state to join the EU and the least homophobic state 
in the region Slovenia still possesses relevance in the question of the relationship between 
EU membership and LGBT rights in the western Balkans. Additionally, because Slovenia 
has been an EU member for much longer than Croatia and has made significant progress 
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on LGBT rights since becoming an EU member state, it can serve as a case study for how 
the EU can continue to influence LGBT human rights once the incentive of future 
membership is gone.  
 As is evident in the timeline, Slovenia made many of its shifts towards more 
progressive LGBT rights policies after it was already an EU member, but along a similar 
timeline to Croatia’s changes once the EU’s new LGBT priorities had been enacted. As 
an EU member state, Slovenia is obliged to comply with EU standards in all areas, 
including fundamental rights. The fact remains, however, that without the incentive of 
future EU membership many states, particularly in Eastern Europe, lag behind in 
controversial areas unpopular with the general public including LGBT rights. For 
example, Poland’s ruling Law and Justice (PiS) political party has used opposition to 
LGBT rights to boost their popularity among far-right Poles. As ruling party PiS has 
opposed progress on LGBT rights within Poland, despite the fact that Poland is an EU 
member state (Cienski 2019). Continuing to make progress on LGBT rights once 
membership is obtained is not necessarily a given in Eastern European member states. 
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Figure 4: Slovenia Timeline 
 
 
  
Notably, in 2016 Slovenia became the first and, currently, only former Yugoslav 
state to recognize same-sex marriage. While Slovenia’s same-sex marriage laws come 
with restrictions, same-sex couples still cannot jointly adopt and lack in vitro fertilization 
rights, it is was a dramatic legislative turn for LGBT rights in Slovenia. What is 
particularly remarkable in this case is that in voting to recognize same-sex marriage, 
Slovenia’s parliament contradicted the will of the Slovenian people who, in 2015, had 
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voted in a referendum not to permit same-sex marriage. Slovenia’s parliament just one 
year later countered that referendum to allow same-sex marriage with only the 
introduction of the restrictions which had not been included in the referendum. This 
demonstrates that even beyond potential shifts in public opinion around LGBT rights, 
top-down LGBT protections continue to be possible following EU membership.  
 While Slovenia as a single case cannot alone demonstrate a trend of states 
evolving on LGBT human rights after becoming EU members, it is an interesting case to 
consider how the EU’s leverage can play out with regard to LGBT rights post EU 
accession. It is an example of how new EU expectations around fundamental rights and 
LGBT rights can change over time without Chapter 23 negotiations.  
4.5 EU Accession from a Comparative Perspective 
 When considering the trajectory of these four cases it is important not to stop at 
comparing their trajectories over time but also to consider where they are in the present. 
Before examining the places in which there are differences, I first want to examine where 
there is an important similarity in the lack of change in transgender human rights across 
the former Yugoslav states. Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia do legally recognize 
transgender individuals but all three require a diagnosis and medical intervention before 
an individual can officially alter their documentation. Croatia also requires the individual, 
if married, to be divorced. Serbia has additional requirements of divorce and sterilization 
(“Trans Rights Europe Map 2018” 2018). Kosovo does not legally recognize transgender 
individuals in any capacity. Blert Morina, a Kosovar transgender man, has filed a 
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complaint against Kosovo’s Agency for Civil Registry after they refused to allow him to 
change his birth name which is ongoing (Halili 2018). The coming months, therefore, 
may bring changes in this area for Kosovo. 
 Transgender rights are not prioritized by the EU in fundamental rights, despite 
their expansion in the 21st century, in the same way lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) 
rights are. There are clear differences, however, between the states with regards to LGB 
human rights in the present day. I have argued in this section that by examining the 
timeline of the EU’s introduction of new priorities in fundamental rights, the introduction 
of each state to the accession process, and the shifts in LGBT rights in each state, while 
shifts in transgender rights are limited, illustrates the influence of the accession and 
negotiations process on LGBT rights. In this portion of the section I also argue that we 
can see the impacts of this in the present-day conditions of the LGBT community in each 
state.  
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Figure 5: ILGA Table 
 
ILGA score 
asylum 
(2018) 
ILGA score 
equality and 
non-
discriminatio
n (2018) 
ILGA score 
family 
(2018) 
ILGA score 
hate crime 
and hate 
speech 
(2018) 
ILGA score 
legal gender 
recognition 
and bodily 
integrity 
(2018) 
ILGA score 
civil society 
space 
(2018) 
Slovenia 33% 55% 56% 13% 45% 100% 
Croatia 33% 51% 41% 51% 46% 100% 
Serbia 0% 52% 4% 38% 0% 100% 
Kosovo 33% 75% 7% 13% 0% 100% 
 
 By comparing the ratings of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and 
Intersex Association (ILGA) 2018 country reports in figure 5 we can see where the cases 
are different in their conditions as well as some places where they are similar.  The most 
notable similarity is the civil society space score with all four states receiving a score of 
100%. All four the cases are open to the activities of civil society, including LGBT 
NGOs and NGOs which advocate LGBT rights as one part of their work. This is 
particularly promising considering that, from the literature, we know that pressure from 
the EU or the international institutions more broadly can give local NGOs more influence 
and power (Ayoub 2016; Swimelar 2017; Mikuš 2011). In these cases where there is 
openness to civil society this is particularly relevant. Additionally, all four states received 
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low scores with regard to their LGBT asylum policy with Serbia in particular receiving a 
score of 0% (“Annual Review of the Human Rights…” 2018, 52, 80, 114, and 118 ).  
 For the most part, the differences in the cases demonstrate a clear divide between 
EU and non-EU cases. With variation to a certain extent there is a clear indication that 
Slovenia and Croatia have similar ratings which are notably higher than Serbia and 
Kosovo. This is most dramatic in the areas of family and legal gender recognition and 
bodily autonomy. From examining the timelines of each state, we know that Slovenia and 
Croatia, for the four cases, are the two which recognize same-sex couples in some 
capacity with marriage and partnership registration respectively. To return to the 
discussion on issues relating to the transgender community, we also know that while the 
states do not differ dramatically in terms of their legal treatment of the transgender 
community Kosovo does not recognize transgender individuals at all and Serbia has the 
strictest requirements for individual recognition. While none of the cases have policies, 
which are particularly friendly to the transgender community, there is some difference 
there which the ILGA has noted in their reports. From the ILGA reports we can discern 
concrete differences across the cases in the present day, corroborating what tracks across 
the timelines of the individual cases. As a result of the changes across time in the four 
cases there are now observable differences between the cases in the 2018 ILGA ratings.  
 By comparing the 2018 ILGA ratings for the cases we can see how the variation 
over time impacts the variation in LGBT human rights in the present. The fact that 
Slovenia and Croatia were motivated to promote LGBT human rights earlier than Serbia 
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and Kosovo means that there is variation in the quality of LGBT human rights today. As 
Serbia and Kosovo, presumably, progress towards EU membership I expect that there 
should be some movement towards the closure of the gaps between the cases.  
Section 5: Conclusion 
 Examining these four cases it is clear that Europeanization shifts, or at least picks 
up, the progression of LGBT human rights in these states. Still, the case of Slovenia gives 
interesting perspective in comparison to the other three cases. While the exact incentive is 
not clear, Slovenia demonstrates that progression on LGBT human rights is possible 
following EU accession. Based on pre-existing literature I would hypothesize that 
Slovenia, or any other EU member state, could be motivated to improve LGBT human 
rights through processes of norm diffusion altering the domestic norms around LGBT 
human rights to become more in line with “European” norms. Unfortunately, 
investigating changes in LGBT human rights in EU member states is not within the scope 
of my research here, but I hope this is an area other scholars will investigate in the future.  
 Ultimately, this project demonstrates the influence of the EU accession process on 
state actions to improve LGBT rights. From the four cases examined in this project it is 
clear the actions of the state can be shifted, and civil society can be empowered, likely as 
a result of the changes in the state. What is less clear, however, is if EU accession can 
influence the opinions of the public in these states, either directly or indirectly. Without 
being able to compare consistent polling of the public in all four cases over time it is next 
to impossible to make a reliable determination in this area. Proxy measures, for example 
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hate crime statistics, are unreliable due to underreporting particularly in states with higher 
rates of homophobia. Having higher rates of hate crimes reporting, for example, could 
indicate a state actually has less violent homophobic crime and high rates of reporting 
such crimes than a state with lower rates rather than more crime as it may seem from 
surface level analysis of the numbers alone. However impactful the measurable changes 
made due to EU accession may be, they are limited without shifts in the public 
conceptions of the LGBT community. Being unable to measure changes in the popular 
view of the LGBT community in the cases is certainly a limitation of this project.  
 This project demonstrates the ties between the process of EU accession and 
dramatic shifts in LGBT human rights across the former Yugoslav states in the EU’s 
Eastern Enlargement. With this evidence tied up with the theoretical framework offering 
explanations as to the exact motivations and processes which motivate these changes in 
the context of the Eastern Enlargement, International bodies, including the European 
Union, should consider more proactively the impacts of their influence in candidate 
states. The implementation of fundamental rights into the EU accession criteria has had 
demonstrable impact in the Eastern Enlargement states. This is not an endorsement of a 
paternalistic approach to homophobia in candidate states. The literature indicates that part 
of the strength of the inclusion of LGBT human rights in the EU accession process is that 
it empowers LGBT NGOs and allies in civil society in candidate states. It is my opinion 
that the EU and other international bodies should lean into this facet of the accession 
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process to truly collaborate with local civil society and give further power to these 
organizations in their state’s progression towards EU accession.   
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